Comments on: Thinking the unthinkable, calculating the incalculable http://72.10.34.174/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/ An ARC Collaboration Thu, 20 May 2010 03:21:29 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0.1 By: Chris Kelty http://72.10.34.174/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/comment-page-1/#comment-39 Chris Kelty Tue, 30 Jan 2007 17:32:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/#comment-39 Interesting intersection with the Nano stuff: Swiss Re is in fact quite interested in careful analysis of the environmental and health risks of nanotechnology; in part because of their experience with GM foods, which caused an equivalent "catastrophic" loss in terms of investments that saw no return as a result of adverse regulation (from the perspective of agri-biotech firms). Even more interesting perhaps is that one of my collaboraters in the nano world is focused on invistigating the toxicity and exposure risks of nanoparticles and one of the most innovative ways he has figured out to do that is by using the insurance industry's methods for calculating relative risk... Robichaud, C.O., Tanzil, D., Weilenmann, U., Wiesner, M.R., “A relative risk analysis of several manufactured nanomaterials: an insurance industry context,” Environmental Science and Technology, 39, 8985-8994, 2005 Interesting intersection with the Nano stuff: Swiss Re is in fact quite interested in careful analysis of the environmental and health risks of nanotechnology; in part because of their experience with GM foods, which caused an equivalent “catastrophic” loss in terms of investments that saw no return as a result of adverse regulation (from the perspective of agri-biotech firms).

Even more interesting perhaps is that one of my collaboraters in the nano world is focused on invistigating the toxicity and exposure risks of nanoparticles and one of the most innovative ways he has figured out to do that is by using the insurance industry’s methods for calculating relative risk…

Robichaud, C.O., Tanzil, D., Weilenmann, U., Wiesner, M.R., “A relative risk analysis of
several manufactured nanomaterials: an insurance industry context,”
Environmental Science and Technology, 39, 8985-8994, 2005

]]> By: Carlo Caduff http://72.10.34.174/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/comment-page-1/#comment-36 Carlo Caduff Sat, 27 Jan 2007 16:09:56 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/#comment-36 ...if I had the time, I would start a research project on Swiss Re and Munich Re, two large re-insurance companies... …if I had the time, I would start a research project on Swiss Re and Munich Re, two large re-insurance companies…

]]> By: Carlo Caduff http://72.10.34.174/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/comment-page-1/#comment-35 Carlo Caduff Sat, 27 Jan 2007 16:06:48 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/vss/2007/01/thinking-the-unthinkable-calculating-the-incalculable/#comment-35 ...are these "catastrophe information systems" working with historical data, or are they based on real-time opinions and predictions of experts? A key move after September 11, 2001 was a partial shift from risk assessment on the basis of historical data to risk assessment on the basis of a pool of contemporary predictions of experts. These predictions change faster than historical data can. The system is therefore more flexible. Maybe that's similar to the "rating agencies"? At any rate, this paper below outlines some of the shifts in the insurance industry after September 11. This would all be worth a research project of its own, I guess. Catastrophe risk, insurance and terrorism Authors: Ericson, Richard1; Doyle, Aaron Economy and Society, Volume 33, Number 2, May 2004, pp. 135-173(39) Abstract: This article empirically investigates how the terrorist activity of September 11, 2001, was addressed by the insurance industry and government in the United States. It shows that the insurance system worked reasonably well in compensating losses suffered, albeit with various tribulations. It also demonstrates that the insurance industry, along with government as the ultimate risk manager, imaginatively reconfigured markets to continue terrorism insurance coverage in many contexts. The findings challenge many of Ulrich Beck's contentions about catastrophe risks and insurability. At the same time, they indicate the fragility of the insurance system. Insurers' perceptions and decisions about uncertainty - with potential for windfall profits as well as catastrophic losses - create crises in insurance availability and promote new forms of inequality and exclusion. Hence, while the insurance industry is a central bulwark against uncertainty, insurers can also play a key role in fostering it. …are these “catastrophe information systems” working with historical data, or are they based on real-time opinions and predictions of experts? A key move after September 11, 2001 was a partial shift from risk assessment on the basis of historical data to risk assessment on the basis of a pool of contemporary predictions of experts. These predictions change faster than historical data can. The system is therefore more flexible. Maybe that’s similar to the “rating agencies”? At any rate, this paper below outlines some of the shifts in the insurance industry after September 11. This would all be worth a research project of its own, I guess.

Catastrophe risk, insurance and terrorism

Authors: Ericson, Richard1; Doyle, Aaron

Economy and Society, Volume 33, Number 2, May 2004, pp. 135-173(39)

Abstract:
This article empirically investigates how the terrorist activity of September 11, 2001, was addressed by the insurance industry and government in the United States. It shows that the insurance system worked reasonably well in compensating losses suffered, albeit with various tribulations. It also demonstrates that the insurance industry, along with government as the ultimate risk manager, imaginatively reconfigured markets to continue terrorism insurance coverage in many contexts. The findings challenge many of Ulrich Beck’s contentions about catastrophe risks and insurability. At the same time, they indicate the fragility of the insurance system. Insurers’ perceptions and decisions about uncertainty – with potential for windfall profits as well as catastrophic losses – create crises in insurance availability and promote new forms of inequality and exclusion. Hence, while the insurance industry is a central bulwark against uncertainty, insurers can also play a key role in fostering it.

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