Editors' Introduction

Dewey's First and Last Love

In 1938, John Dewey completed the mammoth volume *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, which some would consider the "crowning work" of his career (e.g., Edman 1938, 5). Although Dewey had published dozens of articles in the philosophy of logic, some of the most important of which were assembled in the 1916 *Essays in Experimental Logic*, the Logic of 1938 features a unity of expression and fullness of vision lacking in his earlier treatments. In many ways, the Logic marks the consummation of Dewey's lifelong occupation with logical theory, confessedly his "first and last love."¹

The product of the effort of "over forty years" (LW12:5), Dewey's *Logic* is a systematic and comprehensive exposition of his experimentalist philosophy. Accordingly, one finds within its pages discussions of standard logical themes as well as treatments of topics in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of law, and social philosophy. The scope and depth of its ambitions combined with the notoriously taxing style characteristic of Dewey's writing make the Logic a difficult and at times exhausting treatise. It consequently enjoys the curious distinction of being at once among the most highly regarded of Dewey's mature works and the least commonly studied.

Despite the challenges it presents, Dewey's *Logic* merits close attention. In fact, one could plausibly argue that the theory of inquiry developed in the book constitutes the fulcrum of Dewey's philosophy as a whole. A rejection of traditional ways of philosophizing and the problems to which they give rise and a subsequent effort to "reconstruct" philosophy lie at the heart of Dewey's project, evidenced as early as his four essays in *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). Dewey contends that our inherited philosophical traditions arose out of and have failed to advance beyond assumptions and habits of a prescientific worldview. Principal among these presuppositions is a "spectator theory of knowledge," a view according to which knowl-
edge is the passive beholding by an extranatural or "internal" mind of a complete and fixed "external" world. This makes knowledge a mystery insofar as it presumes that the knower and the known belong to two distinct metaphysical realms which in some inexplicable way must come together in the act of knowing. This predicament consequently gives rise to all of the textbook "problems of philosophy": the problem of skepticism, the problem of the external world, the mind-body problem, the problem of other minds, the problem of induction, and so forth.

Dewey's response to these problems, prominent in his work as early as the 1890s, is well known. He contends that many of the concerns central to traditional philosophy should be regarded not as problems in a strict sense but rather as "puzzles" arising from the vocabulary and presuppositions of philosophy itself (1925, LW1:17). Dewey would recommend that we "not solve" these puzzles but rather that we "get over them" (1909, MW4:14). We need a new, reconstructed conceptual vocabulary, which we may obtain by subjecting traditional assumptions and categories to philosophical criticism informed by a scientific worldview. The insight driving Dewey's reconstructive program is that the spectator theory of knowledge is untenable in the light of the successes of modern science. As even the most cursory examination will show, scientific inquiry is premised on the idea that knowing and acting are intimately related. The practice of pursuing knowledge by means of deliberate experimentation, a mode of directed and controlled action, constitutes a rejection of the spectator conception. On the scientific model, a knower as such is an agent within the world that is known, not a ghostly beholder of an antecedent and alien Reality.

Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy therefore stands the traditional conception of the relation of philosophy to natural science on its head. Previous thinkers have taken the job of philosophy to be that of grounding or justifying the practices and results of science, treating philosophical inquiry as if it were logically and epistemically prior to science. Dewey, by contrast, contends that philosophy must begin with the methods of scientific inquiry, deriving its content and modeling its own practices upon them. Hence, his reconstructed philosophy is fundamentally an experimentalist philosophy.

The project of developing such a position requires, therefore, a careful examination of methods employed in the sciences, with regard to both their successes and their failures. From this examination, a more general pattern of inquiry may be developed that would account not only for procedures employed by natural scientists but also for conceptual methods and means employed in a variety of investigatory contexts—from the physical and social sciences to commonplace inquiries into everyday matters. As part of
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This project, the relation of formal logical and mathematical systems to experimental inquiry must be explicated, though this does not exhaust the subject matter of a theory of inquiry. Rather, the resulting general theory must be pertinent and applicable to the full range of philosophical subject matters, including problems of explicit moral, political, and social significance.

This complex undertaking is the mission of logical theory, which Dewey appropriately defines as an inquiry into inquiry (1938, LW12:28). Accordingly, logic is the linchpin of his experimentalism. Although his Essays in Experimental Logic and other logical essays of the 1920s and 1930s begin to make explicit Dewey’s reconstructive project, his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry records his most comprehensive inquiry into inquiry. It is therefore not only an essential text in the Deweyan corpus but an integral contribution to pragmatic experimentalism in general.

An Outline of Dewey’s Logical Theory

The following essays address a variety of concerns regarding Dewey’s logical theory. As each of these essays presumes some degree of familiarity with the general contours of Dewey’s theory of inquiry, it would be appropriate to set out a general overview of that theory.

While much of the following overview draws on the 1938 Logic, the basic outlines of Dewey’s logical theory can be traced back to the 1890s, his Studies in Logical Theory (1903), and his Essays in Experimental Logic (1916b). In particular, much of this earlier work challenges both idealist and realist conceptions of experience and the implications those conceptions have on logical theory. In Dewey’s view, traditional logical theory is marked by a recurring controversy regarding the “ultimate subject matter” of logic (1938, LW12:9). What, after all, do the standard logical operators and relations—if-then, or, and, not, is, iff, some, all, none, etc.—designate? Rationalist and idealist logicians have argued that principles governing such operators and the relations they signify epitomize fixed and necessary “laws of thought” which are discoverable a priori through rational intuition. Empirically minded philosophers understandably have looked with suspicion upon rationalist appeals to any such faculty of “intuition” that perceives or grasps superempirical logical principles. Accordingly, empiricists have endeavored to develop a logical theory based solely upon experience. On the standard empiricist model, the logical relations to which the logical operators refer are inductive generalizations drawn from sense-experiences and thus are known a posteriori.

Despite disagreements concerning the ultimate subject matter of logic,
rationalists and empiricists alike subscribe to a spectator theory of knowledge where acts of knowing and the contents and forms of knowledge are separated. Both schools accept as a fundamental premise the view that the mind stands apart from the proposed source of logical principles. On a rationalist view, logical principles belong to a separate metaphysical realm that is intuited by the mind from a distance. According to empiricists, logical principles are formed by the mind and then overlaid upon sense-experience. Neither view is acceptable.

To take what is discovered to be reliable evidence within a more complex situation as if it were given absolutely and in isolation, or apart from a particular historic situus and context, is the fallacy of empiricism as a logical theory. To regard the thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifications of “pure thought apart from any differences in objects,” instead of as successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material (or objects), is the fallacy of rationalism. (Dewey 1903, MW2:347)

The persistent failure of both of these schools of thought calls for a radical response. For Dewey the solution lies in developing a fundamentally new conception of experience.

Unlike traditional empiricisms that presuppose a particularistic and sensationalistic psychology, Dewey begins from a Darwinian premise of interaction. On this view, experience is “an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment” (1917, MW10:6) and thus “an affair primarily of doing” (1920, MW12:129). Experience then is not a matter of a mind being passively affected by objects, nor a matter of a mind receiving and filtering sensory data from an external world. It is rather an exchange, a transaction, between an organism and the physical and social factors within its environment: “When we experience something, we act upon it; we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does something to us in return” (1916a, MW9:146).

Dewey’s placement of experience in the interactions and transactions between an organism and its environment is further augmented with the recognition of a stabilization propensity characteristic of living beings. Experience is episodic, punctuated by occasions of disturbance and resolution, of imbalance and regained composure. Thus experience is not only transactional. It also has force and direction, impelled by an innate drive of the living being to maintain its own well-being. In short, experience is an activity in and by which an organism maintains integration with its environment.

The story does not stop there, of course, since there is also the issue of
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The role of reflection and rationality in human experience. But it is only a small step from Dewey’s characterization of experience to the doubt-belief picture of inquiry that he adopted from Charles Peirce. Dewey is able to characterize inquiry as a particular kind of experience in which deliberate experimentation and reflection may be a controlling factor in the resolution of doubt and in problem solving more generally. Namely, “Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (1938, LW12:108; entire passage originally in italics). This characterization of inquiry is couched in Dewey’s own technical vocabulary, and therefore requires some unpacking.

Consider first the idea of a “situation.” A situation is both a context and a subject matter for inquiry. We “never experience nor form judgments about objects and events in isolation,” but always within the context of a “field in which observation of this or that object or event occurs” (LW12:72-73). The term environment tends to connote physical as well as social surroundings, but this is not what Dewey means by a situation. What stimulates inquiry is not just an environment as such but rather a field of organism-environment interaction, particularly an instance of breakdown or disturbance in organism-environment transactions. Dewey introduces the idea of a “situation,” the “contextual whole” of an “environing experienced world” (LW12:72), as that to which an inquiry is addressed, arising initially as a kind of disturbance that requires attention. Such a situation, as a stimulus to inquiry, will initially be indeterminate not just in its origins but in possible consequences inherent in how the inquiring agent deals with it.

It should be emphasized that Dewey understands an environment to be composed of both physical and social conditions. Within the environment in which we presently act there are ordinary physical objects such as tables and chairs and books, ordinary physical conditions such as the temperature and atmospheric pressure, as well as certain social factors: laws, customs, traditions, institutions, and social relations of many sorts. The interactions and transactions that initiate and constitute experience may touch on any of these environmental factors. This point applies all the more to inquiry. Social communication and coordination of shared activities is often an integral part of instituting and implementing effective methods of inquiry, particularly in cases where the stimulus to inquiry, an indeterminate situation, is social in nature.

Note, further, that while Dewey elaborated Peirce’s doubt-belief picture of inquiry within the framework of his own theory of experience, he also
adapted certain ideas from William James’s theory of experience, particularly certain aspects of James’s radical empiricism (cf. Dewey 1934, LW10:123–25). Dewey is insistent that, as a subject matter of inquiry, a situation is given (taken) all at once as a qualitative whole. This is not difficult to comprehend if, following James (1909/1978, 172–73; 1912/1976), we acknowledge that relations, not just things related, may be empirically immediate. In such a view there is no limit in principle to how complex empirically immediate “givens” may be. In particular, situations, involving both physical and social relations, may be quite complex, though they are immediately “had” as qualitative wholes (1930, LW5:246–47). This is not to say that everything pertinent to a given situation will be immediately present. But situations as such—the situation of women in contemporary culture, the problem of AIDS, the conflict in Kosovo, etc.—will have a whole individual presence for anyone for whom they are indeed concrete situations.

A situation, then, is both the qualitative context and the background in which processes of inquiry are played out in order to transform that very situation. When a situation is indeterminate, it is “uncertain, unsettled, disturbed” (1938, LW12:109). An indeterminate situation is one that sets a problem for the inquirer. Thus inquiry is a process by which a living being deliberately confronts and deals with an indeterminate situation, a process by which it transforms an indeterminate situation into one that is no longer indeterminate. Inquiry, as pursued by thinking creatures, involves reflection, deliberation, and the use of conceptual tools, but it is not just a mental process insofar as it is a type of directed action aimed at resolving a problematic situation.

So how does all this bear on logical theory? For Dewey, the project of logical theory is to develop an empirically robust account of norms and guiding principles that distinguish better and worse methods of inquiry as they are employed and evaluated in actual inquiries. In a passage that is more prospective than explanatory, Dewey asserts that “all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions” (1938, LW12:11). With experience and inquiry cast as above, we can begin to understand what it means to say that logical forms arise within experience rather than being imposed on it from transcendent sources—though this requires some explanation.

As a study of generic features of inquiry, logical theory is largely concerned with the function of language and conceptual systems in such resolution processes. On the basis of erroneous metaphysical and epistemologi-
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Dewey's Logical Theory has not only been involved in the development of formal properties of linguistic grammars and deductive argument forms. Modern logic has focused too narrowly on the formal properties of linguistic grammars and deductive argument forms. What Dewey requires of logic is that it frame such concerns explicitly within a broader theory of inquiry which incorporates and assimilates inductive and abductive inference and the determination of what to do.

Consider, for instance, the common logical notion of a "proposition." Dewey's "instrumentalist" view of propositions as tentative proposals will seem no less peculiar as many critics have maintained when it is kept in mind that he is concerned not just with deductive argument forms and their formal validity or invalidity. He is equally concerned with processes and principles of abductive hypothesis formation and their inductive "validation" by means of careful experimental design and skillful use of refined techniques of measurement and observation. Contemporary philosophy of science has essentially incorporated all of the key aspects of Dewey's instrumentalism in its recognition that theories, as systems of propositions, are formulated and judged as workable models that advance (or fail to advance) the purposes of scientific investigation. This notion is now (still) usually couched within the unworkable constraints of modern epistemology, but instrumentalism as Dewey initially conceived of it was nothing else but a view of what propositions and theories are as tools of inquiry. As such, it is their function to clarify (to make determinate) facts of the matter at hand, whatever the problem may be, and to articulate an appropriate and workable interpretation of such facts in light of standing conceptual categories. The latter are, of course, subject to modification if and when new problems arise to which existing conceptual systems are apparently inadequate. The history of science provides ample evidence of the conjoint development and evolution of the conceptual schemes, experimental methods, and instrumentalational devices and techniques of observation and measurement which supply the contents and forms of the propositions it uses.

Logic as the theory of inquiry encompasses all of these concerns as they evolve both within single inquiries and in the course of ongoing inquiry. In a given inquiry, the twofold function of propositions—to articulate facts and to interpret them theoretically—is aimed at an eventual formulation and assertion of a judgment as a conclusion that will withstand any subsequent critique. Insofar as the terms of a theory are ultimately framed in operational terms, this renders judgment practical and thus assertible as a formulation of what to do in the given situation in light of determined facts. This clearly applies to everyday practical situations and to issues that are decidedly ethical or moral in character. But it also applies to problems in the sciences and in mathematics, where determining "what to do" is more
a matter of deciding which competing theories or research programs to go with, that is, which are on the right track, which should receive research funds, etc.

Dewey's notion of **warranted assertibility**, which many have mistaken to be a theory of truth, applies not to propositions as such but rather to judgments in their office as conclusions of inquiry. Some judgments will indeed be adequate as responses to a given situation, as formulations of what resolves the given problem, while others will be inadequate. To discover criteria of warranted assertibility, insofar as this can be done generally, is thus a major goal of logical theory. Such an enterprise is not trivial insofar as criteria of warranted assertibility must be discovered and sanctioned in the very process of using them. This has everything to do with understanding the changing ways in which propositions are formulated and operationally instituted to transform given situations. The history of science as well provides ample evidence of how new methods of inquiry and thus new criteria of warranted assertibility have arisen in the ongoing refinement and elaboration of scientific inquiry, providing ample evidence of how logic itself has evolved, from ancient times to the present day. Logic in this sense is no less normative than it is usually taken to be, though it is an evolving experimental enterprise concerned with more than just good and bad deductive argument forms. Logic as a science will be concerned with discovering and validating those methods of inquiry which distinguish better inquiries from worse, particularly with an eye on what promises to work in the long run, not just in the here and now.

Logic is empirical and experimental insofar as it is addressed to actual inquiries, not to mere abstractions. It is rational insofar as it is concerned with methods and principles of inquiry that promise to have relevance and efficacy in the continuation of inquiry in the long run. From this perspective we should expect that the value of contemporary mathematical logic, statistics, probability theory, linguistics, computer science, and the cognitive sciences at large will be as evident as ever, though these disciplines have so far developed in a piecemeal way against a background of erroneous conceptions of the nature of logic.

**Contents of This Volume**

The essays in the present volume are organized into three topical groups. We will forego the standard duty of providing the reader with synopses of the essays and attempt instead to place the issues addressed in the volume within the context of broader philosophical themes.
The volume begins with a number of essays addressing concerns regarding the possibility of a strictly experimentalist logic. Experimentalism, insofar as it is also a kind of naturalism, would reject traditional appeals to transcendental and superempirical foundations for formal logic. That is, Dewey is committed to a metaphysics that rejects a traditional source and ground for formal logical properties and relations such as aprioricity, necessity, identity, possibility, entailment, and validity. Logical theory on this view is instead experimental, empirical, like any good scientific theory. However, it is unclear that one can establish on a strictly experimentalist basis normative claims about how one ought to infer, deduce, hypothesize, and inquire. If a strictly naturalist metaphysics can generate only a descriptive account of how we in fact inquire, then it cannot yield a prescriptive theory of how inquiry is properly conducted. To invoke Peirce's worry, a merely descriptive logical theory can provide nothing more than a "natural history" of thought.

By Dewey's own admission, a solely descriptive account of inquiry is inadequate. Logical theory as an inquiry into inquiry must involve a descriptive and a normative aspect. It must not only provide "an organized and tested descriptive account of the way in which thought actually goes on" but also prescriptions "by which future thinking shall take advantage of the operations that lead to success and avoid those which result in failure" (1920, MW12:157). If there is to be a viable experimentalist logic, then it must be shown that an empirical study of the ways in which we do inquire can give rise to a theory of how we ought to inquire.

Consequently, the pragmatist tradition has generated a number of attempts to reconcile the formal requirements of traditional logical theory with a naturalistic metaphysics. Tom Alexander's contribution engages the crucial exercise of tracing the development of Dewey's logical thinking from its idealist beginnings to its experimentalist culmination. Also focusing on Dewey's earlier work, Jennifer Welchman examines the theoretical underpinnings of Dewey's conceptions of moral inquiry and of practical judgment more generally. The last three essays in part 1 compare and contrast Dewey's theory with the thought of other prominent pragmatist logicians. In Vincent Colapietro's essay, Dewey is brought into critical dialogue with his pragmatist predecessor, Charles Peirce. Sandra Rosenthal and John Shook facilitate similar encounters between Dewey and his successors in logic, C. I. Lewis and W. V. Quine. The result of these conversations is a tighter grasp on the specifics of Dewey's theory and those of his interlocutors, as well as a deepened sense of the difficulties and challenges inherent within the project of constructing a naturalistic logical theory.
Dewey saw his 1938 Logic as both his most comprehensive treatment of logical theory and yet as “introductory” and in need of further development (LW12:5). There is accordingly more work to be done in articulating an experimentalist theory of logic. It is the business of the essays collected in part 2 to further the experimentalist program laid out in Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.

Insofar as Dewey’s experimental logic is a new kind of logical theory, it confronts the obvious difficulties stemming from the immanent conservatism and aversion to the novel that is characteristic of any long-standing intellectual tradition. What is the relation of an experimentalist logic to traditional logic? What advantages does an experimentalist approach have over these standard approaches? Scholars working within a Deweyan paradigm must not only direct their efforts to an internal clarification of the philosophical aspects of Dewey’s logical theory, they must also endeavor to establish a working relation with contemporary developments and techniques in formal logic.

As indicated earlier, a central content of an experimentalist logic is that logical forms at once “accrue” (LW12:29) to subject matter within the process of inquiry, “originate” in inquiry, and “control” inquiry (LW12:11). This conception of the nature of logical forms allows Dewey to avoid the transcendentalism of rationalist logical theory and the particularism and sensationalism of the traditional empiricist theories. However, even sympathetic commentators such as Ernest Nagel (1986) have found Dewey’s account perplexing: How can logical forms both originate in inquiry and control inquiry?

Dewey’s account of the generation of logical forms within inquiry is the principal focus of the essays by Hans Seigfried and Jayne Tristan, while Tom Burke and Douglas Browning address concerns regarding what may generally be thought of as the status of Dewey’s theory. More specifically, Seigfried carefully evaluates Dewey’s 1938 discussion of logical forms as evolving conditions that all inquiries must satisfy. Tristan looks at the fundamental role of measurement (broadly conceived) in the origin and nature of logical forms. Burke attempts to integrate the novelties of Deweyan experimentalism with current developments in mathematical logical and natural language semantics—arguing not that Dewey’s theory of inquiry can be “formalized” but that contemporary formal techniques may nevertheless be incorporated into Dewey’s logical theory. Browning is concerned more fundamentally with examining the very idea—and possibility—of inquiring into inquiry in ways that do not beg important questions. A second essay by Burke evaluates Goodman’s new riddle of induction in light of Dewey’s theory of predication.
The concept of *continuity* pervades Dewey's work in all its aspects. Central to Dewey's logical theory, then, is the idea that there is a general pattern of inquiry that may be extracted from the natural sciences and applied (hopefully with success) to any indeterminate situation. As situations are contextual wholes composed not only of physical and biological factors but of moral and social factors as well, there are situations that are indeterminate in such ways as to constitute *moral, social,* and *political* problems. Hence, an identification and consistent systematization of the pattern of inquiry does not exhaust the aim of an experimentalist logical theory. One must also show how this pattern is applicable to actual problems, including problems of value.

At this suggestion, some will brandish the traditional philosophical saws concerning the metaphysical and epistemological distinctions between fact and value, "is" and "ought," description and prescription. These dualisms have pushed philosophers to adopt either a subjectivist theory of evaluative language, namely, a view which reduces evaluative claims to descriptive claims about the speaker’s psychological attitudes—or else an intuitionist view, in which evaluative expressions allegedly refer to non-natural properties apprehended by a private mental faculty. Maintaining that there is a *continuity* between scientific and value inquiry, the experimentalist must reject both of these options.

The essays in part 3 address Dewey's attempts to reconstruct value theory according to an experimental theory of inquiry. John Capps and Michael Eldridge evaluate the theory through examinations of its practice. Capps looks at how Dewey's theory measures up against actual present-day AIDS research, as well as its implications for the ever-recurrent creationism/evolutionism debate. Eldridge looks instead at a case of social inquiry in which Dewey himself took part, painting a not entirely flattering picture of Dewey as a political problem solver. The volume closes with John Stuhr's critical assessment of the theory of inquiry proposed in Dewey's *Logic,* posing several challenging questions concerning Dewey's inadequate acknowledgment of the impact of social conditions on inquiry (and thus the theory of inquiry).

It is safe to say that there is presently a resurgence of interest in the thought of John Dewey. Recent years have seen an impressive number of important studies of various elements of Dewey's philosophical vision. Despite this swell of scholarship, Dewey's logical theory has received less attention than it deserves. As a collection of essays devoted specifically to Dewey's theory of inquiry, *Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations* will hopefully encourage future clarification, revision, and debate.
Method of Citation

The complete works of John Dewey are available in a critical edition of thirty-seven volumes published by Southern Illinois University Press. As they are standard in Dewey scholarship, all citations to Dewey’s works will be keyed to these volumes. There is a controversy, however, concerning the proper method of citation. The dominant convention among Dewey scholars is to include a parenthetical indication of the volume and page number in the critical edition. As the critical edition is divided into three chronological periods—the Early Works (5 vols.), the Middle Works (15 vols.), and the Later Works (17 vols.)—a standard citation reading (LW12:109) would indicate page 109 of the twelfth volume of the Later Works. Whereas this method of citation is simple and convenient for Dewey scholars who work with the critical editions, it lacks some of the virtues of the more generally employed author/date style of citation. In particular, the convention among Dewey scholars gives no indication of the title or date of the work from which a quote is drawn. Thus, as individual volumes in the critical editions typically contain several essays, articles, reviews, and lectures, this often leaves the specific identity of the source text a mystery.

Wanting to make the present volume accessible to a wide audience, we have elected to revise slightly the conventional method in a way that is more compatible with a standard author/date citation style. We believe this composite style will make for readable citations that convey useful information without too much distraction. With the author/date style, citations usually specify the author and the date of the publication cited, followed by page numbers where appropriate. Citations are included in parentheses when the citation is indeed parenthetical in nature, but otherwise they are given without parentheses. If the author of the citation is already clear from the context, then just a date and page number(s) are given. If both the author and date of the publication are obvious from the context, then just page numbers are given. References to Dewey’s publications follow this same pattern except that page numbers are replaced by a conventional critical-edition citation.

All of this should apply as well to Peirce’s works, where the convention among Peirce scholars is to cite volumes and paragraph numbers in Peirce’s Collected Papers (CP). So “CP4:156” would denote paragraph 156 in volume 4 of the Collected Papers. As the latter multivolume collection is not chronologically ordered, we make no concerted attempt to identify the date of Peirce’s various writings but simply use the standard “CP” style of citation.

Notes

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2. Reader’s Tire

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Acknowledgments

The editors have incurred a number of professional and personal debts in the preparation of this volume, some of which they would here like to try to repay. The idea for a volume of essays assessing Dewey's logical theory grew out of a series of conversations with persons who were originally invited to contribute essays to accompany a scholarly reprint of Dewey's 1916 Essays in Experimental Logic (Southern Illinois University Press, 2002). The resulting volume of essays eventually took on a broader life of its own. Nevertheless, our thanks are extended to those who encouraged the project in its early stages, especially Tom Alexander, Mike Eldridge, Larry Hickman, John McDermott, and H. S. Thayer.

Notes


2. Readers interested in the chronology of these ideas should consult Ralph Sleeper's The Necessity of Pragmatism (1986/2001). Sleeper's study is the most comprehensive and arguably the best available critical summary and evaluation of Dewey's views on logic and their development from the 1890s until his death in 1952.

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